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The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance
Richard Hynes1 & Eric A. Posner2
February 20, 2001

Abstract: This survey of the law and economics of consumer finance discusses economic models
of consumer lending, and evaluates the major consumer finance laws in light of them. We focus
on usury laws, restrictions on creditor remedies such as the ban on expansive security interests,
bankruptcy law, limitations on third-party defenses such as the holder in due course doctrine,
information disclosure rules including the Truth in Lending Act, and anti-discrimination law.
We also discuss the empirical literature.

Introduction
The law regulates consumer credit transactions much more heavily than noncredit transactions like the cash sale of a computer. Nearly anyone can sell computers
to the public, but the creditor – bank, finance company, pawnshop, credit card issuer3 –
is heavily regulated by federal and state agencies: licensed, inspected, and – less so now
than in the recent past – circumscribed by geographic, market, and product restrictions.
The computer seller may offer any cash contract acceptable to the market, subject to
some light restrictions imposed by federal and state law. The creditor may not choose a
price that exceeds the relevant usury ceiling, or remedial terms that are considered too
burdensome by the law. Many kinds of attractive collateral – like household goods –
will not be used, because the security interest would not be enforceable. The law does
not require the computer seller to explain what RAM is, but it does require the creditor

Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Contact: rmhyne@wm.edu.
Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Contact: eric_posner@law.uchicago.edu. Thanks to Douglas
Baird, Peter Alces and George Triantis for their helpful comments, and Steve Aase, Nick Patterson and
Scott Hessell for their valuable research assistance. Posner thanks The Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund and
The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Fund for generous financial support.
3 Or an ordinary seller of goods, but to the extent that the seller offers the goods on credit, she is treated
like any specialized creditor, and sellers of goods often subcontract to such specialists.
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to explain what a finance charge is, and additionally to present information about credit
terms in a stylized way that is supposed to ease comparison of the terms offered by
different companies.
In this survey of the law and economics of consumer finance, we describe and
evaluate the main patterns of consumer finance regulation in the United States. We
examine the state and federal laws that regulate loans to consumers, including cash
loans and loans that finance the purchase of real estate and consumer goods. We focus
on (1) price controls (usury laws); (2) restrictions on creditor remedies; (3) bankruptcy
law; (4) limitations on the use of third-party defenses; (5) information disclosure rules;
and (6) anti-discrimination law. We do not discuss general doctrines of contract law
that are applied to cash sales and credit transactions alike, including the
unconscionability doctrine; statutes and regulations that apply to all consumer
transactions, not just consumer credit transactions, such as laws that regulate
advertising or warranties; and laws that regulate the market as a whole, including
licensing requirements for creditors, geographic and activity restrictions, and antitrust
enforcement.4
The literature on the regulation of consumer credit is not as lively as it once was.
Most contributions were written in the 1970s and early 1980s, and there has been little
work in the 1990s other than work on personal bankruptcy. Yet consumer credit
remains a significant topic of public policy, and it continues to pose difficult questions.
For poorly understood reasons, the individual bankruptcy filing rate has risen rapidly
and steadily since the 1970s, and bankruptcy reform is a recurrent issue in Congress,
generating significant attention in the media. The credit card industry has attracted a
great deal of criticism for its aggressive marketing efforts, confusing credit terms, and
high interest rates. Major retailers such as Sears are criticized for their efforts to
We also do not discuss public choice approaches to the law of consumer finance; see, e.g., Boyes (1982),
Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison (1989), Letsou (1995), Buckley and Brinig (1996), Posner (1997).
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persuade customers to reaffirm debts in bankruptcy. And controversy has swirled
around the sale of credit insurance to low-income borrowers, a practice that has
generated considerable profits for creditors. These and similar issues deserve more
attention from scholars than they have received.
I.

Model
A.

Lending in a Competitive Market

An individual, Debtor, seeks to borrow money in order to smooth consumption
over time. A firm, Creditor, offers to lend money at a certain rate of interest. In a
competitive market the interest rate will reflect the time value of money, inflation, and
the risk of default. Debtor accepts the offer if the benefit, that is, the transformation of
future wealth into current consumption, exceeds the interest rate. If Debtor defaults on
the loan, he is legally required to pay Creditor. If in fact Debtor does pay damages as a
result of a lawsuit, or forfeits collateral of sufficient value, there is no “default” in an
economic sense, as Creditor is fully compensated. The problem for Creditor is that
Debtor may be judgment proof as a result of both legal and nonlegal factors. The legal
factors, to be discussed more extensively below, include restrictions on the ability of
Creditor to seize assets or future income in order to satisfy a judgment. Nonlegal
factors include the difficulty of tracing Debtor if he flees the jurisdiction or goes into
hiding and collecting from Debtor if he simply does not ever earn enough money to pay
off the debt.
Default usually occurs in a bad state of the world in which Debtor loses his job, his
health, or a valuable asset. Risk-averse debtors want insurance against such bad states,
and in addition to the usual forms of insurance, such as automobile and health, Debtor
may purchase credit insurance, which would repay his debt to Creditor if he underwent
certain hardships such as unemployment, illness, disability, or destruction of the
collateral granted to Creditor. Debtor may also obtain insurance from Creditor himself
in the form of a commitment from Creditor to forgive missed payments if certain events
3

occur.5 Nonrecourse loans also reflect this interest in insurance. Debtor allows Creditor
to seize certain collateral upon default but Creditor gives up the right to seek
repayment from Debtor’s other assets.
Consumer loans take many different forms. Simplest is an unsecured loan of
cash. Open-end loans like credit card transactions roll over from period to period;
closed-end loans terminate after a specified number of payments of principal and
interest. Creditors also issue loans secured by goods, contract rights, and other
collateral. Both ordinary creditors and retailers often lend money necessary to purchase
a particular good, and retain a purchase money security interest in that good. Banks
and other creditors issue home equity loans; these are loans secured by real estate.
There is a debate about why secured credit exists.6 Creditors should be
indifferent between issuing a risky unsecured loan with a high interest rate, and a
relatively safe secured loan with a lower interest rate. Debtors should be indifferent
between an additional claim on their assets and a higher interest rate. Therefore,
because issuing secured rather than unsecured credit involves additional administrative
costs greater than zero, secured credit should not exist. Two simple nonefficiency
explanations for the existence of secured credit are (1) that security interests are used for
transferring risk to tort and other nonadjusting unsecured creditors, and (2) that in the
consumer finance context, security interests may be used to circumvent property
exemption laws (White, 1984). Efficiency explanations for secured credit are beyond the

It is likely that some lenders informally commit to forgive loans or at least missed payments through
their reputation. For example, Caplovitz (1967) describes a practice of many credit sellers of abstaining
from legal action after missed payments after using social networks to verify that their low-income
consumers are unable to repay. A commitment to forgive the loan upon the occurrence of certain events
is identical to credit insurance underwritten by Creditor.
6 For early articles presenting most of the basic arguments, see Scott (1977;1979), Smith and Warner
(1979), Jackson and Kronman (1979) and Schwartz (1981). For more recent treatment of the topic, see
Hudson (1995), Bebchuck and Fried (1996) or see Volume 80, No. 8, of the Virginia Law Review.
5

4

scope of this paper, although we note below where they are relevant to the law of
consumer finance.7
B.

Monopoly Power

Abundant evidence suggests that the credit market is generally competitive
(DeMuth, 1986; Pierce, 1991; Elliehausen & Wolken, 1990), but there may be local
monopolies in certain areas of the country, perhaps poor neighborhoods, perhaps the
result of regulations that raise the cost of entering the credit market. In addition, many
laws to be discussed below are defended on the ground that they correct inefficiencies
created by creditors’ market power, so it is useful to examine the possibility that
creditors do have market power.
In an environment with full or symmetric information, a creditor with monopoly
power will charge an interest rate that is greater than that available in a competitive
market but will generally supply the same nonprice terms as a creditor in a competitive
market (Schwartz, 1977). Even if these nonprice terms (such as harsh collection
procedures) are otherwise beneficial to the creditor, they will reduce the willingness of
well-informed debtors to pay for credit. As long as these terms are inefficient, the
creditor would prefer to use its market power to force the debtor to pay a higher
interest rate. The creditor would gain more by charging a higher interest rate than by
obtaining consent to a contract with inefficient nonprice terms.
The conclusion that the monopolist will use the same terms as a competitive
lender requires some technical assumptions. Otherwise, because the monopolist lends
less in equilibrium, the optimal terms of the contract may change. Still, there is no
reason to believe that the contract terms in the monopolized market would be harsher
than the contract terms in the competitive market. And there is no reason to believe
Some of the other efficiency explanations clearly have relevance in consumer finance. For example,
these arguments focus on the ability of secured credit to assign parties to monitor a firm’s assets.
7

5

that forcing monopolists to supply some of the terms that would prevail in a
competitive market would produce a gain. Because the monopoly power remains,
further distortions would occur in the unregulated terms. (Schwartz, 1977)
Monopoly power can have other effects as well, but these require asymmetric
information and thus will be discussed below.
C.

Asymmetric Information: Consumer Ignorance
Even if there are numerous lenders in a market, each lender may have some

degree of market power because of the inability of consumers to costlessly compare
prices and terms. Depending on the source of the information failure, this may result in
either an abnormally high price or abnormally harsh terms. Some creditors will lend
only to those consumers who are unable to compare the (price or nonprice) terms of the
loan offered with the terms available elsewhere in the market.
The problem requires that a large enough number of consumers find it difficult
to shop around. The competitive outcome would occur if a significant subset of the
consumers become informed and if creditors are unable to discriminate between these
creditors and the uninformed by, for example, offering loans with different terms and
interest rates with only the informed consumers able to determine the most desirable
loans. (Schwartz and Wilde, 1979; 1983). That is, if enough consumers compare loans
before borrowing, no lender could make a profit by lending only to those who did not
compare. However, by shopping the informed consumers effectively confer a positive
externality on the uninformed and thus consumers may have too little incentive to
acquire information.
Creditors would seem to have every incentive to distinguish themselves from
their competitors if they offered credit on more attractive terms. However, they cannot
overcome consumer ignorance (possibly resulting from misleading claims made by
Likewise, a mortgage may ensure that some creditor monitors the homeowner’s insurance purchased by
the consumer.

6

rivals) when that ignorance is severe enough. There is a limit to how much explaining a
creditor can do before losing the attention of its customers. Further, in a competitive
market each creditor has insufficient incentive to educate consumers because of that
creditor’s inability to internalize all of the gain from that information. This problem is
lessened somewhat if lenders have market power because they capture more of the
returns from the information and thus have an incentive to provide information about
the entire product, not just the brand. However, a creditor with market power may
have an incentive to provide too little information in order to aid in price discrimination
(Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 1981a). Furthermore, creditors will have insufficient
incentive to explain the economics of the credit market, and the meaning of contract
terms, because they cannot prevent people who have benefited from their expectations
from seeking loans elsewhere. (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 1981b).
It is of course possible for third parties such as trade associations or even
independent groups such as Consumers Union to provide comparisons or standards for
comparison. However, each of these solutions has its own problems. An independent
group such as Consumers Union might supply too little information because it would
have difficulty preventing consumers from sharing the information with others who do
not pay Consumers Union for it. Trade associations may have an incentive to create
standards or report information that favors those within the association over other
competitors, or, conversely, to avoid creating standards for fear of drawing the
attention of antitrust regulators. (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 1981b; Schwartz and
Wilde, 1977).
D.

Asymmetric Information: Creditor Ignorance

The simplest form of information asymmetry occurs when Debtor knows his
willingness to pay for credit while Creditor does not. If Creditor has a monopoly, he has
an incentive to discover Debtor’s valuation so that he can price discriminate. It is
possible that Creditor can separate higher and lower valuation debtors by offering
7

contracts with inefficient terms. For example, Creditor might offer a loan with a high
interest rate and a loan with a collateral requirement but a lower interest rate if this
would help him distinguish between those who are particularly sensitive to the interest
rate and those who are not. The efficiency implications of this practice are obscure. As
long as the monopoly remains intact, a law that prohibits the inefficient term will both
eliminate the cost associated with the term and reduce value by interfering with price
discrimination. Creditor will offer an average interest rate that drives low valuation
debtors out of the market (Craswell, 1995).
Another form of asymmetric information occurs when Debtor knows the
probability of default and Creditor does not. Assume that because of personal
characteristics unobservable by creditors, some debtors have a high probability of
default (“bad” debtors) and others have a low probability of default (“good” debtors).
Harsh remedial terms are more costly for bad debtors than for good debtors because the
bad debtors are more likely to default and thus to become subject to the terms. If
creditors believe that any debtor who fails to grant a security interest (or agree to some
other harsh remedial term such as a cognovit clause) is a bad debtor, creditors may offer
two contracts: a secured loan with a low interest rate and an unsecured loan with a high
interest rate.8 The good debtors effectively “signal” their type by choosing the secured
loan with the low interest rate while the bad debtors choose the unsecured loan. The
creditors’ beliefs are validated in this separating equilibrium. This would be true
regardless of whether the market is competitive or monopolistic (Rea, 1984; Aghion
and Hermalin, 1990).9

Creditor might also be able to determine the type of the debtor through the size of the loan requested
(Freixas and Laffont, 1990).
9 If one imposes stronger assumptions, one can show that a monopolist will behave differently than a
lender in a competitive market. For example, Besanko and Thakor (1987) show that under certain
conditions a monopolist is more likely to prefer credit rationing over collateral.
8
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A rule banning security interests and other harsh remedial terms would be
efficient if the total costs of the signaling exceed the total gains. If there is no credit
rationing and no effect on the debtor’s efforts to avoid default (we discuss both these
assumptions below), the reduced interest rate charged to the good debtors should be
roughly offset by the increased interest rate charged to the bad debtors. In fact, it is
even possible that banning such signaling would benefit the good debtors. The reason
is that the good debtors might prefer a contract with no collateral and with an interest
rate that reflected the average probability of default in the population, compared to a
contract with collateral and a lower interest rate. In the absence of a legal ban on
security interests Creditor would not offer the efficient pooling contract because of his
belief in equilibrium that good debtors issue security interests and bad debtors refuse to
issue security interests.
The fact that security interests and other consensual creditor remedies can be
used to signal information about debtors does not necessarily mean that they should be
banned because this signaling may play a role in reducing a related problem caused by
asymmetric information, credit rationing (Betser, 1985; 1987). Creditor sets the interest
rate to reflect the average probability of default in his portfolio. Assume that good
debtors are less willing to pay a higher interest rate because they are more likely to
repay the loan.10 If Creditor cannot distinguish among debtors, the expected profit from
any particular loan will decline as the interest rate rises beyond some point, because as
the interest rate increases the good debtors drop out of the market. Therefore, creditors
(monopolistic or competitive) will not raise interest rates above this point and credit
will be rationed: the demand by bad debtors for (even high-interest) loans will be
unmet (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). If there are too many bad debtors in the market, their
probability of default is sufficiently high, and the divergence in the probability of
The assumption that the good debtors are more likely to drop out of the market as the interest rate rises
is standard, but not universal. For an article assuming the contrary, see Besanko and Thakor (1987).
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default is too large, the market unravels leaving only the bad debtors willing to borrow,
but creditors unwilling to lend to them. This is the phenomenon of adverse selection
(Akerlof, 1970). Security interests and related terms may reduce adverse selection by
enabling the creditor to distinguish among good and bad debtors. Security interests
and similar terms can serve as signals because they are cheaper for debtors who are less
likely to default.
Credit rationing can also result if there is asymmetric information about whether
or not the debtor “can” repay a loan (Jaffee and Russell, 1976). That is, debtors may
have an incentive to claim destitution in order to avoid repayment and it may be
difficult for creditors or courts to verify that this is correct. In an extreme case, the only
mechanism that the creditor may use to force repayment is to deny future credit (Allen,
1983). Collateral with personal value to the debtor and other forms of creditor remedies
ensure that a defaulting debtor cannot in fact repay if the debtor would rather repay the
loan than endure the “punishment” of repossession (Rea, 1984; Scott, 1989).
Another kind of asymmetric information problem arises when Debtor has
private information about the care with which he avoids default. “Care” can mean a lot
of things: (i) working hard, so that he is not fired and deprived of an income to repay
the loan; (ii) protecting assets or collateral so that they may be liquidated in case of
default; (iii) avoiding physical risks that might result in injury; or (iv) avoiding risky
investments. If Creditor cannot observe Debtor’s level of care and penalize Debtor if he
takes insufficient care; and if Debtor does not expect to repay the debt in full because of
the legal and nonlegal factors mentioned above; then Debtor will take a suboptimal
level of care. This is the problem of moral hazard.
One response to this moral hazard is to prohibit, by contract, behavior that
increases risk. An example is the covenant against using residential property for
commercial purposes. But this response really assumes away moral hazard by
supposing that conduct is observable: when conduct is unobservable, it cannot be
10

prohibited by contract. The second response to moral hazard is to require Debtor to
bear some of the cost of default, thus converting a debtor who might otherwise be fully
judgment-proof into one who is partly judgment-proof. For example, requiring that
personally valuable property be collateral reduces the probability that Debtor will be
able to protect it at the time of default through judicial process. Alternatively, Creditor
might seek to destroy Debtor’s reputation by publicizing the default; to cause psychic
harm by liquidating a guarantee from a loved one; or, in the case of loan sharks, to
break bones. Even though these actions provide no direct benefits to Creditor while
conferring costs on Debtor, they may be efficient because they reduce moral hazard
(Rea, 1984).

II.

Law
A.

Price Restrictions: Usury Laws

Description. Every state has laws restricting the interest rate that can be charged
for consumer loans. However, although the interest rate ceilings in some states are quite
low, their effect on the credit market is likely to be limited. There are many reasons for
this. First, federal law preempts state usury laws in a variety of cases, the most
important being home equity loans, for which there is no federal interest rate ceiling.11
Further, since the late 1970s, federal law has permitted federally insured state
institutions to “export” the high interest rate ceilings of the states in which they are
located, thus permitting them to lend at high interest rates to debtors who reside in
states with low ceilings. 12 Second, state usury ceilings have long been riddled by
exceptions for, among other things, small loans, retail installment loans, and loans
issued by favored institutions like credit unions. Third, interest rate ceilings often

This was actually an incomplete preemption as the states were given the right to “opt out” and fourteen
states did so. (Alperin and Chase 1986)
12Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corporation, 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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understate their effective limits, the result of special rules for calculating interest rates
when lenders compound, charge fees, give discounts, and calculate balances in different
ways. Fourth, remedies for violation of usury laws are frequently narrow (Alperin and
Chase, 1986). Fifth, usury ceilings may be evaded in many ways, for example, by
disguising interest as part of the “price” of the good if sold on credit with a discount for
cash transactions, or by disguising a secured transaction as a lease with high rental
payments and a low buy-out price (Peterson, 1983). Sixth, many usury ceilings are set
at fixed interest rates thereby lessening their importance in periods of low inflation such
as the present time. Still, usury ceilings have theoretical interest and historical
significance, and they continue to influence many ordinary lending practices.
Effects. Usury laws are simply price controls, and can be predicted to have many
of the same effects: queuing, unsatisfied demand, and an illegal market, loansharking.
Unlike standard price controls, however, it is doubtful that usury laws lower the price
of a loan (the interest rate) paid by any particular borrower. Because there are many
alternative uses of capital, a prohibition of high interest rates will simply lead creditors
to refuse to lend to high-risk debtors and instead lend to lower-risk debtors at legal
rates or to seek other investment options. To the extent that high interest rates are the
result of market power enjoyed by lenders, either as a result of monopoly power or
search costs (Ordover and Weiss, 1981), usury laws might be able to lower the rate
charged to borrowers. But there is little evidence that creditors have market power or
that consumers lack good information about interest rates, especially after the
implementation of the Truth in Lending Act described below (Schwartz and Wilde,
1979). Even if lenders did have some monopoly power and the usury ceiling reduced
the rates paid by some debtors, these ceilings would cause higher risk debtors to be
denied credit as creditors would be unable to charge them higher rates, thus offsetting
much, if not all, of the welfare gains. Ausubel (1991) raises the possibility that interest
rates on credit cards are artificially high because of the irrationality of consumers. He
12

argues that low-risk credit card users intend never to borrow and therefore do not
consider the interest rate when choosing among credit cards; whereas high-risk credit
card users do consider the interest rate. Because creditors cannot distinguish between
low-risk and high-risk debtors, no creditor would lower its interest rate as it would
disproportionately attract high-risk debtors. A limit on interest rates could therefore be
welfare improving. However, Ausubel’s thesis is controversial. More recent studies
have found that consumers are sensitive to interest rates (Gross and Souleles, 2000) and
economists remain nearly unanimous in condemning usury laws.
Some of the early empirical literature on usury did find that states with usury
laws had lower average interest rates.13 But most of the literature found that usury laws
result in a significant reduction in the access to credit for high-risk debtors.14 In fact,
Villegas (1982; 1989) finds that the entire decline in the average interest rate is
attributable to the exclusion of these debtors from the market; the usury laws do not
reduce the interest rate paid by an individual debtor. This result is unsurprising: the
supply of loans should not be inelastic if capital can be used for other projects or in
other jurisdictions. The only surprising thing about these findings is that because usury
laws are so easy to circumvent, it is difficult to believe that they have any impact on
behavior in a modern economy with efficient capital markets.
Usury laws have a long and significant history, are still important in many
jurisdictions, especially Islamic countries, and continue to resonate with the moral

See, for example, Greer (1973), Peterson (1979), Peterson and Ginsberg (1981), Shay (1973) and Wolkin
and Navratil (1981).
14 See, for example, Boyes and Roberts (1981), Dunkelberg and DeMagistris (1979), Greer (1975), Kawaja
(1969) and Shay (1970). For studies finding no credit rationing, see Eisenbeis and Murphy (1974),
Goudzwaard (1968; 1969) and Peterson (1983). This is consistent with studies of the mortgage credit
market which typically find that restrictions on usury reduce the number of building permits due to a
reduction in home financing. See Austin and Lindsley (1976), Boyes and Roberts (1981), Robins (1974),
Ostas (1976), and Crafton (1980). But see Rolnick, Graham, and Dahl (1975) and McNulty (1980) finding
no significant effect on building permits but finding a significant effect either on non-price terms or on
loan volume.
13
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intuitions of many people. This has led scholars to suggest possible benign
explanations for their popularity. First, a usury law may be a crude form of social
insurance in a jurisdiction that has poorly developed capital markets closed to the
outside world and an inefficient or nonexistent welfare system (Glaeser and
Scheinkman, 1998). If usury ceilings depress the price of credit, the poor would be able
to borrow more cheaply and this may be efficient if the poor have a sufficiently higher
marginal utility of money than the rich. From an ex ante perspective, an individual
benefits from usury laws if his lower return when he has capital to spare in some future
state of the world is offset by his lower borrowing costs when he needs to borrow in
some alternative future state of the world. This argument is inconsistent with the
mobility of modern capital, and so has no application to modern conditions;
significantly, usury laws have been repealed in every industrialized nation except the
United States, Belgium, and France (Alperin and Chase, 1986), though a fairly restrictive
usury law was enacted in Italy in 1996.
Second, welfare laws create a moral hazard and usury laws may therefore be
needed precisely because they restrict access to credit. Because welfare laws reduce the
consequences of default for the debtor by providing him with a minimum standard of
living after his creditor employs all available remedies, the debtor will be willing to
borrow to undertake riskier ventures (Posner, 1995).15 Usury ceilings prevent these
high-risk loans and therefore reduce the negative consequences of the moral hazard.
This argument assumes that people benefit from welfare laws, and, unlike the first
argument, that an effective welfare system is in place.
There is little statistical evidence for these theories; they are intended to
rationalize historical practice and rely mainly on anecdotal historical evidence.

A related argument posits that usury laws prevent low-income debtors with a high discount rate from
borrowing against future welfare payments and that this credit rationing permits a society committed to
provided a minimum per period welfare to do so at a lower cost. Avio (1973).
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B.

Restrictions on Creditor Remedies

Description. A confusing array of federal and state laws restrict many of the tools
that creditors have traditionally used to force repayment, including the reporting of
past consumer behavior16 and nonlegal mechanisms such as contacting the debtor and
third parties to request repayment. Self-help can be effective; debtors repay loans in
order to avoid unpleasant phone calls, threatening letters, humiliation in front of
friends, employers, and family members, and damage to their credit reputation.17
Federal and state laws restrict the ability of credit reporting agencies to record
information that creditors may find relevant. The Fair Debt Collections Act requires
certain kinds of creditors to (1) verify the debt if the consumer challenges it; (2) refrain
from threats and harassment; (3) refrain from publishing the names of defaulting
debtors; and (4) refrain from misrepresentation of their legal rights, the consequences of
nonpayment, and so forth (Alperin & Chase, 1986). While the federal act does not
directly apply to the creditor that originated the loan, its restrictions may apply to the
creditor’s lawyers18 and some states apply similar regulations to the original creditors as
well. Accordingly, we discuss these rules in this section rather than in the section,
below, on third party defenses.
When self-help fails, creditors often sue and obtain repayment through
prejudgment and postjudgment remedies. Prior to judgment a creditor may be able to
obtain a lien on the debtor’s assets and to garnish the debtor’s wages, and these powers
are usually sufficient to obtain repayment. However, prejudgment attachment and
garnishment are now regulated in various ways by the state and federal government;

The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000), limits the reporting of bankruptcies by consumer
reporting agencies to ten years and limits the reporting of most other adverse information to seven years.
17 For example, early in the modern history of consumer credit “small lenders relied on the professional
services of the ‘bawlerout,’ a female employee who was assigned the job of trapping the delinquent
borrower before co-workers and family in order to browbeat him publicly for being a sorry deadbeat.”
Calder (1999); Rea (1984).
18 Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
16
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they are also subject to constitutional due process limitations. Garnishment, both
prejudgment and postjudgment, is heavily restricted by federal law (roughly to 25
percent of wages, but with many exceptions) and some states have even more restrictive
limits or prohibit garnishment altogether. There are fewer restrictions on postjudgment remedies; these usually involve the sheriff seizing and auctioning off
property, or (again) garnishment of wages, which remains heavily restricted even as a
postjudgment remedy. Postjudgment seizure of property is significantly curtailed by
state (and federal) exemption laws, which limit the kind and amount of property (home
equity, clothing, furniture, pensions and so forth) that can be seized in order to satisfy
unpaid debts.
A creditor can improve his ability to collect by bargaining in advance for certain
rights. For example, a cognovit note, in which the debtor essentially binds himself to
confess judgment if he defaults, relieves the creditor of the trouble of proving his case in
court. However, cognovit notes are illegal in many contexts (Alperin and Chase, 1986).
By obtaining a security interest a creditor gains priority over unsecured creditors and, if
the security interest is perfected, creditors with later in time security interests in the
same property. In the context of consumer finance, the power of the security interest to
alter the creditor’s rights with respect to the debtor is perhaps even more significant.
Because a secured creditor can seize much of the property that would otherwise be
exempt under state or federal law, debtors and creditors can use security interests to
effectively waive many of the exemptions. In addition, the security interest may also
allow the creditor to skip some of the steps in the judicial process, and even skip it
altogether if he can repossess the collateral without breaching the peace. At one time,
creditors would obtain security interests in all the debtor’s household goods, even those
that were not purchased from the creditors or with the creditors’ money.
Today, however, secured consumer credit is heavily regulated. FTC regulations
and some state laws forbid creditors to obtain nonpossessory nonpurchase money
16

security interests in household goods, although there are some exceptions. The
bankruptcy code also permits debtors to nullify nonpurchase money liens in many of
these same household goods. Some states provide the debtor (and sometimes even
junior lien-holders) a right to redeem the collateral for up to a year even if the collateral
has been sold to a third party, and require the creditor to obtain a court judgment before
repossessing collateral. Finally, a foreclosure on collateral will sometimes preclude the
creditor from seeking the remainder of the amount owed through a deficiency
judgment. Common law and state statutory rules granting a right of redemption and
prohibiting deficiency judgments are important forms of regulation of the home
mortgage market.
Many of these restrictions are available in bankruptcy, but we discuss
bankruptcy separately, below.
Effects. Critics argue that the strong contractual rights to repossess consumer
goods are inefficient because the repossessed property has minimal resale value for the
creditor but considerable personal value for the debtor; these remedies are used in
order to coerce (Leff, 1970; Whitford, 1986). While there is some evidence that fire sales
exist (assets are sometimes sold for less than their wholesale book value),19 critics argue
that the perception that value is lost is based on a misunderstanding of the operation of
markets; it is unlikely that value would be destroyed given the characteristics of the
debtors and creditors and the ability to renegotiate (Schwartz, 1983) and as long as
creditors believe that a reputation for aggressive collection techniques might scare off
debtors (Peterson, 1986). As we saw above, however, even collection mechanisms that
are inefficient at the time of collection may be efficient ex ante precisely because they are
“coercive.” They can, in theory, reduce moral hazard by increasing the cost to the
See Schuchman (1969), White (1982), Note (1971), Note (1975). Grau & Whitford (1978) show that
repossessions declined after Wisconsin enacted a statute that required creditors to obtain a judgment
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debtor from defaulting (Rea, 1984), and adverse selection by enabling the creditor to
distinguish among debtors by risk level (Bester, 1985). (See generally Epstein, 1975;
Scott, 1989.) Regardless, the restrictions on creditor collections generate costs for
creditors and creditors should pass these costs on to debtors in the form of higher
interest rates or else deny access to credit, particularly for high risk debtors.
Restrictions on coercive creditor remedies in general,20 and exemptions in particular, 21
are associated with higher interest rates and increased probabilities of denial of credit.
The effects are more pronounced for low-income or low-asset debtors.22
As noted above, exemptions do not directly affect the ability of the secured
creditor to foreclose on the most valuable assets of the debtor (such as the home) and
therefore only affect the supply of credit by raising transaction costs, that is, by
requiring parties to go through the formality of obtaining a security interest in order to
make assets available for collection in case of default. In contrast with the results for
general credit found by Gropp, Scholz and White (1997), Berkowitz and Hynes (1999)
find that mortgage lenders do not increase the rate of denials or the interest rate in the
face of larger exemptions. There is actually a small decrease in these variables. This
may occur because as exemptions increase, debtors have more unencumbered wealth
with which to pay off secured creditors, and costly foreclosures are less likely to be
necessary.
before seizing collateral from a defaulting debtor. This result is entirely predictable, and, as they appear
to acknowledge, they do not show that debtors are made better off by the law in an ex ante sense.
20 See, for example, Greer (1974) and Barth, Gotur, Manage and Yezer (1983).
21 See Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) (examining the effect of the exemptions on credit markets
generally) and Berkowitz and White, (2000) (examining the effects of the exemptions on the market for
small business loans). We note that Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) use the same data set used by
Villegas (1990) to investigate the effects of usury laws and restrictions on creditor collections other than
exemptions. A further study disentangling the effects of each of these restrictions would be useful.
22 That exemption laws have a pronounced effect on debtors with few assets is somewhat of a puzzle as
these debtors can exempt all of their assets in almost any regime. For example, Gropp, Scholz and White
(1997) find a significant reduction in the access to credit for debtors with assets of less than $7,885 when
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Limitations on creditor remedies do provide some benefits to the debtor. These
limits provide some insurance by protecting the debtor’s income and assets when he is
least well off. As noted above, they may also prevent socially wasteful debt collection
practices. But a defense of these laws has two predicates, both of them difficult to
establish. First, the law should restrict remedies only if a market failure prevents
creditor from supplying remedial terms that debtors would be willing to pay for and
prevents the debtor from using alternative form of protection, such as credit insurance.
23

The usual market failure arguments can be made, of course. Perhaps, adverse

selection explains why credit contracts rarely limit the creditor’s remedial rights. But if
the market did fail in this way, it is hard to understand why there is such a robust
market in credit insurance.
Second, the defense assumes that the law does reflect debtors’ preferences. But
the variation of the law across states is too extreme to reflect plausible differences in
debtors’ preferences. For example, an individual can exempt only a few thousand
dollars worth of assets in Alabama but a potentially unlimited amount of home equity
in Florida. The variance is too high to reflect risk preferences across the two states or
other differences in the states’ economies; and indeed a study of exemption laws in all
fifty states over a twenty-two year period reveals no correlation between the generosity
of exemptions and demand for insurance (Posner, Hynes, and Malani, 2001).
The exemptions and the bankruptcy right to a discharge may address another
concern, that of creating a class of people who do not work because they cannot keep
their income or the assets they purchase with it; this explanation is also consistent with
limitations on the ability of creditors to contact (and annoy) a debtor’s employer.
Although creditors and debtors have incentives to renegotiate ex post, as the history of
the exemptions move from the merely large (exemptions between $25,400 and $70,400) to the unlimited
exemptions.
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debtor prisons shows renegotiations will occasionally fail because creditors want to
maintain a reputation for toughness or hope to flush out debtors who have concealed
their assets. A class of people immobilized or even imprisoned for debt sits uneasily
with mainstream political commitments. Of course, this argument fails to the extent
that debtors can “waive” exemptions under state law or through the use of security
interests. However, statutory waivers of exemptions are not effective in bankruptcy;
nor are nonpurchase money security interests in many forms of personal property. In
addition, a debtor cannot waive his right to a discharge.
To the extent that debtors can waive exemptions and other limitations on
creditor remedies, these laws merely change the default rule for collections upon
default. Rather than contracting for protection through credit insurance, nonrecourse
loans and other means, the debtor waives protections through security interests,
cognovit notes, etc. A comparison of the merits of the two default rules would require a
deeper analysis of the preferences of debtors, the costs of contracting, the enforcement
of limitations on default planning and other factors that are beyond the scope of this
paper.
Villegas (1990), Peterson (1986), and Barth, Cordes and Yezer (1986) try to
determine if restrictions on creditor remedies provide a net benefit or a net cost. Their
logic is that if the restrictions are beneficial, the increase in the interest rate demanded
by the creditors should be more than offset by the increased willingness to pay by the
debtors. One should be able to verify this directly by separately estimating supply and
demand or indirectly by observing the total quantity borrowed. The results of these
studies are mixed. Barth, Cordes and Yezer (1986) found that while statutes limiting
deficiency judgments may provide a net benefit, legal restrictions on confessions of
judgment clauses, restrictions on garnishment, and restrictions on security interests in
Supra note [__] and accompanying text. We acknowledge the criticisms of this market, where profits
appear to be unusually high.
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real property created a net cost. Villegas (1990) found that restrictions on security
interests in personal property and restrictions on wage garnishment provided a net
benefit but that prohibitions on wage assignment created a net cost. Although he did
not discuss this normative analysis, Greer (1974) and Peterson and Frew (1977) both
found that prohibitions against attorneys’ fees and garnishment reduced the total
borrowings. Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) also do not conduct an explicit comparison
of the costs and benefits of the exemptions. However, they do examine the effect of the
exemptions on the total quantity of credit and find that the exemptions increase total
borrowings by high-asset debtors but decrease total borrowing by low-asset debtors.
Therefore, following the logic of Villegas (1990), larger exemptions seem to provide a
net benefit for high-asset debtors but provide net costs for low-asset debtors.25
While these results are interesting, the tests are imperfect. The comparisons
assume that lenders and borrowers (or at least some borrowers) are aware of the legal
restrictions, can correctly predict their implications at the time of borrowing, and can
adjust the contract in light of these factors. This assumption is questionable if the
market failure justifying government intervention is that debtors underestimate the
probability of default or that debtors lack information about the consequences of
default. Moreover, even if debtors are fully informed, a finding that total credit
increases is not a necessary condition for determining that the laws are beneficial.
Debtors may be willing to accept lower borrowing levels as a price for increased
insurance.26 In addition, involuntary creditors such as tort claimants cannot adjust to
the laws by charging a high interest rate. Finally, the limits on creditor remedies may

Schill (1991) finds that the right of redemption and anti-deficiancy judgment rule in the mortgage
market raise mortgage interest rates by only a small amount, and argues that this cost may be
outweighed by other benefits. He does not examine the effect of these rules on access to credit, however,
and he does not empirically evaluate the benefits in addition to the costs.
26 For an example of this, see Appendix.
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play a role similar to those of usury laws in discouraging high-risk loans undertaken as
a result of the moral hazard created by social welfare laws (Jackson, 1985).
C.

Bankruptcy

Description. By filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the federal bankruptcy
code, a debtor can protect all of his future income from his creditors, retain exempt
property, preserve certain kinds of trust funds including pensions even when they are
not exempt under nonbankruptcy law, and delay the seizure of other assets through the
automatic stay. Debtors may not file for bankruptcy seriatim, but the bankruptcy
discharge remains a powerful weapon for the defaulting debtor. There is an extensive
literature on the structure and effects of this law, and we will not reproduce it here.27
However, a brief overview of some of the empirical literature on bankruptcy is
necessary for a proper understanding of the results discussed in Section B.
Effects. While several studies cited above find that restrictions on creditor
remedies, including exemptions that apply in bankruptcy, affect the decision to borrow,
there is little evidence that these same restrictions affect the decision whether or not to
repay. This is surprising because debtors in financial distress should be more aware of
the law of collections than debtors applying for a loan, particularly if they have retained
an attorney. Likewise, creditors should not change their lending behavior in response
to exemptions unless the exemptions have a real effect on their expected losses.
Unfortunately, good data on default and collections are not available by state.28 The
existing evidence, based on bankruptcy data, suggests that exemptions do not
For a recent survey of the consumer bankruptcy literature, see Kowalewski (2000). The law is
frequently criticized for being too generous and inflexible. See, e.g., White (1998a; 1998b), Wang and
White (2000), Adler, Polak, and Schwartz (2000).
28 Empirical studies of the effects of garnishment restrictions on the filing rate highlight the shortcomings
of focusing on bankruptcy filings. These studies generally find that states with laws that are more
restrictive of the ability of a creditor to garnish a debtor’s wages have higher filing rates. See, for example,
Apilado, Dauten, and Smith (1978), Ellis (1998a) and Heck (1981). While this effect could be due to higher
repayment rates, it is more plausibly due to the ability of defaulting debtors to protect their future
incomes without filing for bankruptcy.
27
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significantly affect the filing rate (see below) and it is unlikely that the exemptions
substantially affect repayment rates in bankruptcy given the minimal repayments that
unsecured creditors actually receive (White 1987).
Arguing that larger exemptions should make bankruptcy more attractive to
debtors, many scholars predicted that larger exemptions should increase bankruptcy
filings. While White (1987) found a positive and statistically significant effect, the effect
that she found was small and virtually all other published papers have found either no
statistically significant effect or even an effect with the “wrong” sign.29 This result has
been repeated in more recent studies reexamining the problem with panel data or
quasi-experiments.30
Because the literature was forced to compare the exemptions and the bankruptcy
filing rate, its failure to find a strong positive correlation is less surprising than it
appears. The majority of exemptions available in bankruptcy are also available to a
debtor defaulting under state law and therefore while the exemptions should make
default relatively more attractive than repayment, they do not necessarily make
bankruptcy relatively more attractive than defaulting under state law. One can
reestablish a link between the exemptions and the incentive to file for bankruptcy based
on transactions costs, though these theories are more tenuous. In addition, if larger
exemptions lead to more defaults they should also lead to more bankruptcy filings as
long as bankruptcy filings remain a fairly constant fraction of all defaults. (Hynes,
1998).
The failure to find a correlation between exemption levels and bankruptcy filings
may also be due to an inappropriate use of aggregate data when testing a hypothesis

See, for example, Apilado, Dauten, and Smith (1978) (finding mixed results when testing for a link
between exemptions and the filing rate prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978);
Peterson and Aoki (1984); and Shiers and Williamson (1987).
30 See Buckley and Brinig (1998), Weiss, Bhandari and Robins (1996). But see Pomykala (1997) and Hynes
(1998) finding significant positive effects.
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about individual behavior.31 The exemptions may have little effect on aggregate filing
rates because they are relatively generous compared to the assets of most Americans,
and the reduction in access to credit may mean that debtors in states with large
exemptions may be less likely to end up in financial distress.32 While current working
papers use individual level data to examine the filing decision, their results cannot
readily be interpreted as a test of the impact of exemption levels. These papers test
whether debtors respond to the financial incentives of bankruptcy more generally,
including the discharge, rather than just the exemptions and therefore examine the
effect of the debtor’s “benefit” from filing. “Benefit” is defined as the debt that can be
discharged less any assets above the exemption that the debtor would lose by filing
(Fay, Hurst and White, 1998; Chakravarty and Rhee, 1999). Even if the exemptions have
no effect on the filing decision, the coefficient on “benefit” may still be significant
because households with more debt file in order to obtain the discharge.
Several studies investigate whether the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 increased
the filing rate and related actions.33 That statute instituted several reforms that could
have made bankruptcy more attractive (Domowitz and Eovaldi, 1993), and the
bankruptcy filing rate increased markedly in the years that followed. Using time series
econometrics techniques, scholars have tried to disentangle the effects of this act from
the significant macroeconomic effects of this time period. The majority of the early
studies addressing this question did, in fact, estimate that the code played a significant
Early scholars attributed this “failure” to possible simultaneity bias; legislatures might adopt smaller
exemptions in response to higher filing rates. Peterson and Aoki (1984), Shiers and Williamson (1987).
However, it is unclear why this same bias would not have a significant effect on the studies of the credit
market. While we lack a good explanation for a state’s choice of exemptions, one might be able to test
this theory by using historical exemptions as an instrumental variable.
32 It is possible to collect data on loans made by lending institutions in each state. However, the
importance of national lenders in the mortgage and credit card industry makes it unlikely that such a
variable would be highly correlated with the debt issued by residents of each state.
33 While we will discuss those articles discussing the decision to file, the interested reader may wish to
consult those articles discussing the effect of the act on the choice between Chapters 7 and 13. See, for
example, Domowitz and Sartain (1999a; 1999b).
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role in increasing the bankruptcy filing rate.34 One difficulty with this literature,
however, is that it requires a controversial assumption regarding the treatment of
married couples filing jointly, which was not permitted prior to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) examine summary statistics presented in
studies of actual filings to determine a range of values for the proper adjustment to the
postact filing rate. When they use the lowest value of this range, they estimate that the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 increased the filing rate by twenty-two percent.
However, the standard errors in their regression are so large that this estimate is not
statistically significant; one does not find a statistically significant result until one uses a
value near the upper end of this range. One solution to the problem highlighted by
Domowitz and Eovaldi (1993) would be to measure the effect on defaults (as measured
by loans charged off by banks) rather than bankruptcies.
Another difficulty with examining the effect of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 is that there were three other major legal changes that occurred at about the same
time. In 1977 the Supreme Court ruled that restrictions on advertisements by lawyers
are an unconstitutional restriction of free speech,35 thus increasing the spread of
information about the advantages of filing for bankruptcy. In 1978 the Supreme Court
ruled that the interest rate paid by a borrower on a loan from an out of state bank
would be governed by the usury ceiling of the state in which that bank was located.36
This reduced the ability of a state to set effective interest rate ceilings and increased the
number of high-interest, high-risk loans.37 Both of these events could have stimulated
bankruptcy filings independent of the effect of the 1978 Act. Finally, the Fair Debt

See, for example, Shepard (1984), Peterson and Aoki (1984) and Boyes and Faith (1986). But see
Bhandari and Weiss (1993).
35 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
36 Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
37 Ellis (1998b) does discuss the relative importance of interest rate ceilings and the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. However, by using state usury rates prior to 1978, a more rigorous attempt at disentangling
the effects might be possible.
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Collections Act, discussed above, was passed in 1977. While this act may have
increased the default rate, it should have decreased the bankruptcy rate by enhancing
the ability of debtors to avoid repayment without filing for bankruptcy. The fact that
the Fair Debt Collections Act may have had an effect on the bankruptcy rate that would
have conflicted with the presumed effects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and the other
laws is yet another reason to examine the default rate rather than the bankruptcy rate.
D.

Third-Party Defenses

Description. When retailers sell products on credit, they frequently resell the debt
to a third party creditor. After this sale, the buyer is obligated to make payments
directly to the third party creditor. Historically, this was true even if the contract
between the buyer and the retail seller was vulnerable to legal challenge. If, for
example, the buyer purchases defective goods from a subsequently judgment-proof
seller, the buyer would not be able to use the seller’s breach as a defense against the
third-party creditor’s claim for repayment of the loan, and would have no remedy
against the original seller. This outcome was compelled by the holder in due course
doctrine when the buyer signed a negotiable instrument, but could easily be obtained
contractually by adding a waiver-of-defense clause to a nonnegotiable instrument. The
usefulness of these doctrines for third-party creditors is now severely restricted by
federal and state law. (Alperin and Chase, 1986)
Effects. The division of labor between seller and third-party creditor clearly has
advantages. Each party can specialize in developing expertise in its own market. The
third-party doctrines also enhance the ability of creditors to reduce region or seller
specific risk by reselling the debt, sometimes in large pools as “securitized” assets. The
existence of these advantages is supported by studies showing a reduction in the ability
of retailers to obtain financing and in the ability of consumers to obtain credit in
jurisdictions that were the first to ban the third-party doctrines (Rohner, 1975).
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Opponents of the holder in due course and negotiability doctrines argue that the
deep-pocketed financier can more cheaply bear the risk of breach by the seller than the
buyer can, and further that it can more cheaply monitor sellers and prevent them from
breaching in the first place. When financiers have a continuing relationship with the
seller, these conditions may be met. But if these conditions are met and the market is
competitive, then all three parties will voluntarily place the risk on the financier. It is
not necessary for the law to prohibit the parties from choosing alternative relationships,
and indeed such a prohibition would reduce social welfare.
The regulations appear to be based on the assumption that the market fails,
perhaps because of pervasive consumer ignorance, and that the regulations compel the
outcome that the parties would want. This argument assumes that consumers
irrationally fail to update their beliefs about credit practices, even though they appear to
do so in cash sale contexts, where sellers supply warranties (for example) in order to
attract buyers. Although this is possible, it seems just as likely that consumers take
advantage of the cost savings permitted by specialization and diversification.
E. Information disclosure
Description. The Truth in Lending Act and related state and federal laws require
creditors to provide credit information in a clear and consistent way. These laws apply
not just to the credit contract itself, but to all communications such as advertisements,
bills, responses to billing inquiries, and credit reports. Although the Truth in Lending
Act and the associated regulations are complex and impose a number of obligations on
creditors, 38 we will discuss two of the primary elements of this act. First, this law
requires lenders to clearly present the “amount financed,” “finance charges,” and
“annual percentage rate” as calculated in a standardized manner. Second, the law

For example, the Truth in Lending Act regulates the process of correcting billing errors, the credit card
customer’s liability for unauthorized use of the card, and so forth. For reasons of space, we do not deal
with these and other restrictions.

38

27

requires creditors taking a security interest in the debtor’s home to provide an explicit
disclosure of such security interest and the debtor’s right to rescind the contract within
three days (this right may be extended to three years if certain disclosure requirements
are not met). The Truth in Lending Act provides for enforcement both by regulatory
agencies and by borrowers who are given a private right of action (Alperin and Chase,
1986).
Effects. The stated goals of the Truth in Lending Act are to increase economic
stability, to enhance the ability of consumers to shop for attractive loan terms, and to
prevent inaccurate and unfair billing. The first of these goals cannot be evaluated
empirically and the last of these goals is similar to the prevention of fraud and hence
beyond the scope of this paper. The second goal is largely consistent with the
discussion of information failure presented above. The standardized calculations
required by the act, the amount financed, the finance charge, and the interest rate, are
classic examples of scoring systems and there is some evidence that the Truth in
Lending Act increased consumer awareness of the terms covered by the act, particularly
the annual percentage rate.39
Unfortunately, there is also some evidence that the beneficial effects of these laws
in enabling consumers to better shop for attractive loans may have been limited to welleducated, affluent borrowers.40 Moreover, a problem common to all scoring systems is
that firms are driven to emphasize the measured attribute at the expense of hard-tomeasure attributes (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 1981a; 1981b). If consumers focus
disproportionately on the interest rate, lenders have an incentive to compete over this
term and provide less attractive collection terms or cut back on customer service. There
is some evidence of this phenomenon: borrower awareness of terms not covered by the

Mandell (1971), Brandt and Day (1974), Day and Brandt (1973), Shay and Schrober (1973).
Brandt and Day (1974), Day and Brandt (1973), Deutcher (1973), Mandell (1971), Shay and Schober
(1973), White and Munger (1971).
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Truth in Lending Act, such as the dollar amount of the finance charges, actually fell
after its passage (Brandt and Day, 1973).
The required disclosure of the scores created by the Truth-in-Lending Act is
more controversial. These scores are brand specific information and creditors should
have sufficient incentive to disclose this information in order to gain a competitive
advantage. Government regulation may overcome a collective action problem if no
single creditor would have the incentive to invest the resources to establish a credible
standard. While a period of mandatory disclosure may be helpful in establishing the
government sponsored scoring system ((Beales, Craswell and Salop 1981b), any further
period of mandatory disclosure would seem unnecessary as typical stories of collective
action problems stemming from brand specific information are inapplicable.42 Of
course, we noted above that creditors with market power may wish to conceal private
information in order to engage in price discrimination, but there is little evidence that
they have such market power.
The requirement that creditors provide special disclosure (accompanied by a
right of rescission) of any security interest taken in the home is a better example of
mandated disclosure. Creditor obviously has no incentive to inform Debtor of the legal
consequences of a security interest and to disclose the right of rescission, and his
competitors may have insufficient incentive to disclose them as well (see above). We
note, however, that the traditional argument for mandated disclosure would seem to
encompass much broader disclosure of the legal consequences of failing to pay a debt
that what is required by the Act. If debtors do not know about the effects of security
interests, they are not likely to know about the holder in due course doctrine or the
Beales, Craswell and Salop (1981b) do concede that such required disclosure may be necessary for an
introductory period.
42 Securities law, for example, requires issuers of securities to reveal a great deal of financial and business
information. A popular explanation for this requirement is that issuers fear that if they provided
41
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right of redemption. The difficulty is that too much disclosure of technical information
may overwhelm debtors and cause them to ignore it (cf. Beales, Craswell, and Salop,
1981b).
The most forceful complaints about the Truth in Lending Act have centered on
the cost of compliance. In addition to the administrative costs of compliance, the Truth
in Lending Act may have reduced the ability of creditors to collect on bad loans since a
determined debtor can almost certainly find some fault with the disclosure by the
creditor (Rubin, 1991). The act has been amended several times, most recently in 1995,
in part to address this complaint. While there is limited survey evidence that the
difficulty in compliance reduced creditors’ willingness to advertise and risk violation
(Angell, 1971), we know of no papers assessing the effect of this law on creditors’
willingness to lend.
F.

Antidiscrimination laws

Description. The Fair Housing Act, as amended (FHA), forbids creditors to
discriminate against applicants for home mortgage loans on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin or handicap or family status. The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, as amended (ECOA), forbids them to discriminate against applicants
for credit generally on similar, though not identical grounds. Although not technically
an antidiscrimination statute, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, as amended,
enhances the ability to test for discrimination by requiring financial institutions to
report data on all of their applicants for home mortgages, including the race of the
applicant.
Perhaps the most significant antidiscrimination statute is, by its express terms,
not an antidiscrimination statute at all. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)

adequate information to their investors, this information would also be revealed to their competitors, but
all investors and issuers would be better off if adequate information were revealed (Mahoney, 2001).
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requires the appropriate federal banking regulators to "encourage . . . institutions to
help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered
consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions.” However, the CRA
was largely justified on the grounds of perceived discrimination and interpretations by
regulatory agencies refer to minority groups (Hylton and Rougeau, 1996).
Effects. There is an extensive literature on the role of discrimination in lending
markets and a full review is beyond the scope of this paper.44 There is clear evidence of
historical discrimination in lending markets, often supported by overt government
policy, but there is no consensus as to whether discrimination still plays a significant
role in credit markets, whether it plays a role in some credit markets like the mortgage
market but not others,45 and whether such discrimination that exists is based on animus
or the use of race as a statistical proxy for credit risk (Hylton and Rougeau, 1996; 1999;
Swire, 1995). To understand the difficulty of evaluating the laws against discrimination,
suppose that discrimination is due to the use of proxies. On the one hand, a prohibition
of the use of statistical discrimination may force creditors to expend resources to try to
distinguish between debtors and may exacerbate asymmetric information problems.
On the other hand, statistical discrimination may cause minorities to underinvest in
human capital and the development of a credit history, in anticipation of being denied
credit on account of their race (Hylton and Rougeau, 1996).
There have been few successful suits brought under either the FHA or the ECOA
(Swire, 1995), and therefore there has not been much academic debate concerning these
laws. By contrast, the CRA has been controversial: many have argued that it is costly,
possibly self-defeating, and at best ineffective. The CRA generates significant
compliance costs only for those banks that have branches in low income areas and thus

Good surveys can be found in Hylton and Rougeau (1996) and Swire (1995).
Partly because of the data generated by the Home Mortgage Discrimination Act, empirical studies of
discriminatory lending focus on the mortgage market rather than other segments of the credit market.
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may discourage large banks from serving low-income areas (Macey and Miller, 1995)
and discourage the development of small banks to serve low-income debtors (Hylton
and Rougeau, 1999). Hylton and Rougeau (1996; 1999) argue that the current
enforcement approach encourages hollow compliance in the form of loans to wealthy
developers operating in low-income neighborhoods or agreements designed solely to
appease politicians and political activists, and rent seeking behavior by politicians,
interest groups, and even rival banks trying to block bank mergers. Finally, Schill and
Wachter (1995) argue that by targeting the location of the investment, the CRA and
related laws may encourage concentration of poverty in urban areas.
In the end, there are plausible arguments for and against the CRA and its net
effect remains unresolved. Commentators agree that the CRA needs substantial reform,
but they disagree strongly as to the direction this reform should take with some calling
for safe harbor provisions or a switch to a subsidy system and others calling for more
vigorous enforcement.
Conclusion
Regulation of the market for consumer credit provides a number of benefits to
consumers. It gives them information about the terms and consequences of the credit
transaction, it provides them insurance against shocks, and it protects them from
discrimination. But a proper defense of consumer credit regulation must explain why
the market would not supply these benefits if consumers are willing to pay for them.
The availability of credit insurance, the many ways in which typical credit transactions
trade off between interest rate and risk, and the existence of information intermediaries
all suggest that the market does respond to some degree to consumer demand for credit
protections.
Models that incorporate information asymmetry and market power have
ambiguous implications for consumer credit regulation. Information problems do
prevent markets from achieving the first best, and laws regulating the credit market can
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in theory increase social welfare. But it is difficult to determine whether the premises of
the models are met in reality. Complicating the analysis, it is not clear how sensitive
consumers and creditors are to the law, whether because of irrationality or “rational
ignorance.” And it is not clear how much the law would influence the behavior of even
a rational, well-informed consumer, given the many loopholes, the limited penalty
structures, and the many ways in which creditors can evade the law and creditors and
debtors can contract around it.

APPENDIX

This appendix sets forth a simple example of how a law that solves a failure of the
credit market could, in theory, result in a decline in total borrowing.
Assume that there is a debtor with per period utility U() where U’>0 and U’’<0 and a
creditor that is risk neutral. Assume that the debtor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
the creditor to borrow some amount B. Assume further that the debtor has no first
period income and will have a second period income of L with probability p and a
second period income of H with probability (1-p). Assume that the debtor defaults if
and only if second period income equals L (the marginal dollar borrowed does not
affect the probability of default) and that he is entitled to retain an amount E in default.
Finally, in order to make the example as simple as possible, assume that neither the
creditor nor the debtor discount future values.
The creditor must charge an interest rate (R) such that:
B = (1 – p)(BR) + p(L – E), or

R=

B − p( L − E )
(1 − p) B

The debtor will therefore maximize:
U(B) + (1 – p)U(H – BR) + pU(E), or
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U ( B) + pU ( E ) + (1 − p)U ( H − (

B − p( L − E )
))
(1 − p)

or, the debtor will set
B − p( L − E )
U ' ( B) = U ' ( H − (
))
(1 − p)

In this very simple example, the amount borrowed is always decreasing in the exemption. The reason is
that the debtor seeks two things: low cost credit, and insurance. The lower exemption – which in this
example is set by contract rather than by statute – reduces the cost of credit but also reduces the amount
of insurance. If the latter effect dominates (as in this example), an optimal exemption results in less
bargaining than a less generous exemption. This example is deliberately contrived; it assumes that the
probability of default is independent of the amount borrowed, and only considers how the exemptions
affect borrowing through a change in the interest rate. If a debtor is reluctant to borrow a certain amount
because he may end up in a very painful default, the exemptions could increase borrowing by lessening
that fear. This effect is not present here because a marginal change in borrowing has no effect on the
probability of default and never reduces consumption when the marginal utility of consumption is higher
than it is in period one. A more general model would show that if both factors are considered, an
increase in total borrowing is sufficient to show that a law is efficient but is not necessary.
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